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4 Aligning security and privacy
The case of Deep Packet Inspection
Sara Degli Esposti, Vincenzo Pavone and 
Elvira Santiago-Gómez
Introduction
When surveillance functionalities are embedded into security tools and systems the
risk of facing a backlash, due to widespread privacy concerns, may increase dramat-
ically. Speed enforcement cameras, for instance, have produced strong resistance in
the UK since 2001 (Wells and Wills, 2009). By the same token, in 2008 the prospect
of deploying body scanners in EU airports raised serious public concerns and
produced strong public opposition (Bellanova and González Fuster, 2013).  As
explored by van den Broek et al. in this volume, on the one hand, individual
privacy concerns may contribute to increase public resistance to surveillance tech-
nologies; on the other hand, the perceived trustworthiness of the institutions, or
entities, in charge of managing the surveillance system may contribute to decrease
public resistance. However, many other factors may also play a role.  Thus, at the
time of deploying a new surveillance-based security measure, it is hard for devel-
opers and product designers to imagine all end-users’ reactions and to foresee the
kind of concerns the technology will eventually trigger.
Understanding the reasons behind, and the manifestations of, public resistance
to surveillance technologies is certainly a complex task. Resistance to surveillance
technologies may produce a wide range of public reactions, from simple avoidance
to active opposition (Marx, 2003). Cultural, historical, and sociological factors may
also influence both public perceptions and privacy and security attitudes (Pavone
and Degli Esposti, 2012). Resistance to surveillance is also often based on existing
knowledge about technologies (Ball, 2002), which implies that people’s educational
level and the degree of familiarity with the technology may also contribute to
orient public opinion.  As pointed out by van den Broek et al. in this volume, citi-
zens’ political opinions may also play a role in the context of a political
demonstration.
Finally, the prevailing tendency to frame privacy and security as antagonistic
values in security policy discourses, as pointed out by Strauß in this volume, have
also prevented the academic community from achieving a deeper understanding
of individual privacy concerns, security attitudes and public resistance to surveil-
lance.  To overcome these limitations, the SurPRISE Project was designed to
challenge the privacy–security trade-off framework by empirically investigating
factors influencing public attitudes toward surveillance technologies, in line with
previous exploratory studies (Pavone and Degli Esposti, 2012).
This chapter aims at shedding light on the complex phenomenon represented
by public resistance to, or acceptance of, surveillance technologies used to ensure
human security, by offering insights on a particular surveillance technology, which
is Deep Packet Inspection (DPI).  We rely on both quantitative data gathered in six
European countries and qualitative data gathered in the UK to draw our conclu-
sions. Based on the analysis of the data, we offer evidence of the detrimental effects
that a technology’s perceived degree of intrusiveness exercises on a technology’s
perceived effectiveness. In other words, we find empirical support for the claim that
security and privacy, being part of a broader concept of human security, are
compatible rather than antagonistic dimensions. In addition, we offer preliminary
evidence of the negative effects caused by the adoption of blanket-surveillance
security strategies on end-users’ perceptions.
Digital surveillance, individual privacy concerns and
technological acceptance
For a long time, dominant interpretations of opinion pool data on individuals’
privacy concerns have led the academic community to believe in the existence of
a privacy paradox, which can be summarized in a simple statement: ‘despite reported
high privacy concerns, consumers still readily submit their personal information in
a number of circumstances’ (Smith et al., 2011, 993). However, recent studies have
challenged this interpretation and questioned the assumption that people adopt a
cost-benefit approach when it comes to privacy risky data sharing decisions
(Turow et al., 2015).
Frequently users do not fully understand they are sharing their personal data for
free services and apps. Often users feel they have no choice but sharing their data and,
as a result, they feel resigned (Turow et al., 2015). Many people tend to believe that
the regulatory system in place protects their right to privacy and intimacy (Hoofnagle
and Urban, 2014), even in the absence of their active mobilization, as it happens in the
case of food labelling or medical treatments.  Very often people inaccurately believe
that the law protects them from third-party data sharing activities (Hoofnagle and
Urban, 2014). In the case of location apps, users are also often unaware of the moni-
toring functions embedded into the same device.  When users become aware of the
data processing functionalities of mobile apps they might feel betrayed and, as a result,
outraged (Shklovski et al., 2014, Xu et al., 2011).  This might be the reason why, when
confronted with the prospect of losing control over their personal data, the vast major-
ity of users of online services express their concerns. For instance, as reported by van
den Broek et al. within this volume, lay people consider especially unacceptable that
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) sell customer data.  Therefore, the privacy paradox
(Acquisti, 2010) not only appears to be an interpretation far too simplistic, unable to
map the complex set of emotions generated by modern digital surveillance practices
(Shklovski et al., 2014), but it also shifts the responsibility of data and privacy protec-
tion to individual citizens, away from the corresponding public authorities.
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When lay people discover dataveillance (Degli Esposti, 2014; Clarke, 1988), they
tend to react in a negative way. Sometimes, they perceive digital surveillance as
something inevitable, an intrinsic part of the digital revolution; as a consequence
they feel resigned and tend to succumb to it just because they do not want to miss
the relational and job opportunities the Web offers (Turow et al., 2015).  Without
these opportunities, many individuals, and especially the ‘digital natives’, are likely
to feel unable to achieve full integration in our society.  A minority of people,
nonetheless, try to avoid, evade or circumvent surveillance by adopting different
strategies, from the intentional provision of inaccurate information, to the adop-
tion of anonymization and privacy-preserving tools.
Recent scandals showing the ability of governments and private firms to
constantly monitor citizens and consumers have exacerbated the situation making
people feel even more powerless, vulnerable and exposed (Ball, 2009). From an
organizational perspective, mass surveillance has become so cheap, and its applica-
tions so numerous, that it is just easier to find arguments to justify its adoption, and
contribute to its proliferation, than to question it (Hoofnagle et al., 2012). Digital
technologies have transformed surveillance performed by security agencies from a
time-consuming and expensive practice into a technological routine so convenient
that the asymmetry of power between citizens and the State has increased dramat-
ically (Bankston and Soltani, 2014).
Within this scenario, it becomes especially urgent and necessary to renew current
efforts to analytically explore how citizens interpret surveillance-oriented security
technologies (SOSTs), i.e. those technologies that are being introduced in order to
improve human, public or national security, and what, in the common pursuit of
higher security, they expect from these technologies. If living in a surveillance soci-
ety (Murakami Wood, 2009) might generate a sentiment of resignation and a sort of
passive behaviour, we should nonetheless distinguish between those who actually
support the adoption of certain surveillance measures, from those who are not
happy with these solutions, but have not been able to demonstrate their dissent yet.
Moreover, in current times characterized by a growing mistrust towards security
agencies and public institutions (Gandy, 1989,  Verble, 2014), understanding and
rethinking the relationship between privacy, security and surveillance becomes
extremely important for the future of democratic societies (Bauman et al., 2014).
To shed light on these issues, this chapter focuses specifically on public percep-
tions of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), and relies on both qualitative and
quantitative data to investigate the complex articulation of arguments, factors and
priorities influencing citizens’ acceptance of surveillance measures used for secu-
rity purposes.
The distinction between public acceptance and acceptability 
of DPI
Within this study, we use quantitative data to study those factors influencing public
acceptance of DPI, while we tried to use qualitative data to explore public acceptability
of DPI. Unfortunately, within this study we could not gather enough qualitative data
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to fully explore the issue of public acceptability of DPI. Nevertheless, some consid-
erations regarding this topic are included in the next section and a clear conceptual
distinction between acceptance and acceptability is provided in the next paragraphs.
In order to clarify our terminology, a clear distinction between public accept-
ance and acceptability of technology needs to be made.  We consider that a
technology is accepted (i.e. public acceptance of technology) when it is received
neutrally, or favourably, and the population of the region, or country, where the
measure is adopted not only does not engage in any form of collective, or individ-
ual, action meant to create disruptions to the deployment and implementation of
the technology by complaining, protesting, refusing to use the solution or oppos-
ing it in any way, but actively supports its deployment.  According to this definition
public acceptance is the opposite of public resistance.
In contrast, we say that a technology is acceptable (i.e. public acceptability of tech-
nology) when it has the potential of being endured, because the measure is tolerable,
adequate and conforms to approved societal or ethical standards.  While techno-
logical acceptability represents a forward-looking concept which entails some
ethical criteria, which help us judge the appropriateness, or legitimacy, of a tech-
nology, acceptance is a backward-looking idea and can only be used to assess the
extent to which a technology, which has been already adopted in a certain social
and cultural context, has triggered public opposition or acquaintance.
Although in policy documents (EC, 2012), and in the academic literature
(Siegrist, 2008,  Venkatesh et al., 2003), the construct most widely used is public
acceptance, the idea of acceptability deserves to be further investigated as it may
help identify controversial aspects of technologies in phase of design and as it may
suggest criteria or guidelines for improving the design and management of tech-
nological systems. Nonetheless, we expect that technologies which are considered
acceptable by the public are also technologies accepted by the public.  Although
acceptance and acceptability are two interrelated ideas, public acceptance does not
necessarily imply acceptability from a legal or human rights perspective.
Surveillance technologies may enjoy high public acceptance but still run contrary
to established human rights, or national constitutional principles, or to existing
regulation. Sometimes public acceptance can be the result of repression, lack of
freedom of expression or simple inertia or lack of information.
Finally, we should remember that security technologies differ from consumer
technologies because they are used to monitor and protect the public, but they are
not chosen or operated by the public. In the case of security technologies, which
are not chosen by citizens, but by security agencies and public authorities, we
consider that the study of SOSTs’ acceptability is especially important and should
be developed further in future empirical studies.  Although SOSTs are used to
protect citizens and to prevent, or respond to, security threats, citizens are not
involved in the design and selection of security measures.  This lack of participation
in the decision-making process reduces drastically the impact of public opinion on
the development of security technologies. By better understanding the criteria lay
people use to assess the acceptability of SOSTs, scholars could help governments
and security agencies develop more sensible solutions (Hess, 2014).
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The data collection
Data presented in this chapter were gathered as part of the SurPRISE project,
funded by the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, between
January and March 2014, during 12 citizen summits held in nine European coun-
tries, involving approximately 200 citizens per country.  The SurPRISE citizen
summits were full-day events. Participants received information before and during
the event, discussed topics related to specific SOSTs in small groups of six to eight
persons, and filled in an electronic questionnaire along the day.  As concluding
activity each group of citizens was asked to formulate recommendations for policy-
makers to be used. Summit participants had also the chance to write their thoughts
on individual postcards, and participants’ opinions were also annotated by table
moderators and note takers. More information on the SurPRISE citizen summit
methodology can be found in previous publications (Degli Esposti and Santiago-
Gómez, 2015).
During each summit two out of three specific SOSTs were discussed.  These
SOSTs were: Smart CCTV, Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), and smartphone loca-
tion tracking.  Within this chapter we will rely on evidence related to the case of
DPI. Qualitative data used in this chapter were gathered during the citizen summits
held in England. In contrast, quantitative data here analysed come from six EU
countries, which are Austria (sample size n = 220), Italy (n = 180), Norway (n =
113), Spain (n = 163), Switzerland (n = 204) and the UK (n = 244).
Deep Packet Inspection
Given the importance of digital communications, interactions and relations, this
article focuses on lay people’s opinions of a specific surveillance technology, which
is Deep Packet Inspection (DPI). DPI is a type of data processing that looks in
detail at the contents of the data being sent. On the Internet, any information sent
or received is collected into packets, which have a label on them called a header that
describes what these packets are, who sent them, and where they are going: just like
a letter flowing through a postal network. DPI is a method of packet filtering which
allows examining the content of a packet rather than simply read its header by
deeply analysing packet contents, including information from all seven layers of the
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model.  As DPI makes it possible to find, iden-
tify, classify, reroute or block packets with specific data or code payloads, it has been
compared to a postman opening one’s letters and reading their contents
(SurPRISE, 2014).
As many ICT technologies, DPI has several applications. Internet service providers
(ISP) can use DPI to allocate available resources to streamline traffic flow, or to apply
different charging policies, traffic shaping, or offer quality of service guarantees to
selected users or applications (Antonello et al., 2012). DPI has been used by major
network operators in the U.S. and Canada to block or restrict the speed of peer-to-
peer file sharing traffic by their customers (Mueller and Asghari, 2012). In enterprises,
it is used to ensure network security, and to support quality of service and terms of
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use, copyright enforcement, target marketing and  behavioural advertising to online
customers (Corwin, 2011). DPI represents a basic component of network security as
it combines techniques such as protocol anomaly detection and signature scanning,
traditionally available in anti-virus solutions (Anderson, 2007).
DPI is also used in the fight against major crimes such as child pornography,
transnational organized crime and terrorism (Person, 2010). However, DPI has
been also used by Libyan and Syrian Governments to spy and capture rebels, and
it is used by the Chinese Government as a censorship tool (Fuchs, 2013).  The
Snowden’s revelations also demonstrated that DPI has been used by the NSA to
spy on both citizens and public authorities of several countries around the world
(Lyon, 2014). It is important to consider that, by the time the citizen summits took
place, DPI had begun to receive remarkable media attention, due to the NSA scan-
dal and Snowden’s revelations. For this reason, most users were aware of the
existence of this technology.
Summit participants’ perceptions of Deep Packet Inspection
Citizen summit participants had the chance to learn about DPI before and during
the events.  They received a booklet before the event and watched a short docu-
mentary film on DPI during the event which helped them understand this specific
technology. Most citizens in all the six countries where DPI was discussed were
confident about their understanding of DPI functions and operations. Moreover, in
all countries except the UK, more than half of the participants said to be fairly
knowledgeable about the way DPI was used.
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Figure 4.1 Agreement with the statement ‘I understand what DPI is’
Although British participants had some doubts about the functioning of DPI,
they were able, nonetheless, to engage with the topic and discuss its advantages and
drawbacks.  As reported in the following quote, extracted from one table discussion,
DPI was considered to have useful security applications, though also to be prob-
lematic in terms of regulation and accountability.
F4: Overall it was felt that DPI would be useful against cyberbullying, child
pornography, terrorist attacks and other security related issues. However, it’s
hard to regulate who uses this information and for what purposes and inter-
national agreement on how to regulate this seems impossible. 
(Table moderator’s reflections)
Nearly half of the participants in all countries considered DPI an effective national
security tool, even though regulatory instruments were considered in general
insufficient to tackle the problem of preventing inappropriate uses of DPI.  As
shown in Table 4.1, only 19 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement ‘laws
and regulations ensure that DPI is not misused’.  As expressed in the following
statement made by a citizen participant, the main problem is that Internet users rely
on services offered by organizations subject to different laws and regulations from
the ones enforced in the user’ country.
AbB30-C5: National security. I’m happy to have it but it needs more control.
How do I get junk mail when I don’t give people my details? I noticed a
difference when I started using Yahoo mail. Because of today I know this is
because of the lack of rules or different rules in America.
Nevertheless, laws, regulations and legal procedures are interpreted by the public as
a possible solution to ensure the correct adoption of SOSTs.  As reported in the
following statements, legal guarantees contribute to set standards for the acceptable
use of SOSTs.
AbB11-C5:  There should have to be a warrant to hack into my email, a crim-
inal investigation reason for it.
AbB28-C5: None but there should be regulations about it to protect us.
Despite the fact that DPI was considered useful in improving national security by
almost half of the participants (48 per cent), two third of them said DPI was never-
theless highly intrusive (71 per cent). Figure 4.2 highlights the difference between
the perceptions of British and Austrian participants on the matter.  A higher
proportion of British respondents considered DPI an effective security measure
(UK: 58 per cent;  Austria: 28 per cent), while a higher proportion of Austrian
people considered DPI intrusive (Austria 56 per cent; UK: 16 per cent). For a more
in-depth discussion on the effect of culture on privacy and security attitudes see
Budak, Rajh and Recher within this volume.
By looking at the data collected during the citizen summits, we can see that DPI
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was perceived to be the most intrusive measure (71 per cent), more than smart
CCTV (51 per cent) or smartphone location tracking (55 per cent). One of the
reasons behind this difference in perceptions is that people feel to have no control
over the way Internet is governed and managed.  We quote the following conver-
sation as an evidence of this assertion.
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Figure 4.2 Agreement with the statement ‘In my opinion, DPI is an effective national
security tool’
Table 4.1 Level of agreement with each statement
DPI sCCTV SLT
Freq. Per cent Freq. Per cent Freq. Per cent
1. Laws and regulations ensure 195 19% 260 24% 278 28%
that DPI is not misused
2. I believe that DPI improves 507 48% 645 59% 505 51%
national security
3. I believe that DPI is intrusive 750 71% 553 51% 549 55%
4. I think that the level of 372 35% 517 48% 483 49%
intrusiveness is acceptable 
given the benefits DPI offers
5. None of the above 22 2% 28 3% 25 2%
6. DK/NA 13 1% 12 1% 9 1%
Total number of respondents 1050 1087 994
AbB34-C5: Of the two, DPI and Smart CCTV, I prefer the Smart CCTV.
More control over that. Nearly everyone in this room uses the Internet and
we have no control over it.
AbB35-C1:  There will be terms and conditions on websites.
AbB36-C5: But nobody reads them and it’s not enough. I think there should
be a section for our own terms and conditions. No control.
At the time of balancing intrusiveness against effectiveness of DPI, only one-third
of participants considered the level of intrusiveness of DPI acceptable (35 per cent).
In contrast, nearly half of the participants said to consider the intrusiveness of smart
CCTV (48 per cent), and smartphone location tracking (49 per cent), reasonable
given the benefits these technologies offer.  This variation may be explained by the
fact that people tend to perceive the Internet as a private space, rather than as a
public space.  The fact that the activity is performed while people are at home, or
at work, which are considered intimate spaces, wherein confidentiality is safe-
guarded, may generate some confusion and make people underestimate the risks
of being online.  The following reflection made by a note taker and the statement
made by a study participant offer some insights into some lay people’s perceptions
on the matter.
RhBSum: Interestingly, they saw a big difference between the privacy concerns
with smart CCTV and DPI.  They felt that when you are outside the house,
you must expect to be watched by others. However, inside the house and
online, people feel as though their actions are private and personal. 
(Note taker’s reflections)
AbB9-C5: I was naïve to think until today that some of my information on
the Internet was private and now I know I can be hacked.  This conference has
made me realise. I can be compromised financially.  There is no control.
Digital communications are also expected to resemble analog communications;
which are characterized by attributes such as mail correspondence confidentiality.
Because of these expectations, participants tended to perceive DPI as a more
deceptive, subtle and invasive measure than the other technologies analysed.
Compared to smart CCTV systems, which are positioned in public places, DPI
operates in what are considered private spaces during activities, such as surfing the
net or sending emails, that are also perceived as private (Degli Esposti and Santiago-
Gómez, 2015).  As any automated digital system, DPI goes also virtually undetected
by users when it is used to spy on people.
F4: [DPI] It’s an unseen invasion of privacy, worse than CCTV because it is
more personal (online banking, etc.) and open to fraud.  There is very little
public awareness.  Worries were expressed about government covering up the
use and purposes of DPI. Overall the pros do not outweigh the cons. 
(Table moderator’s reflections)
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The lack of transparency on the use and purpose of DPI generated a feeling of
frustration and resignation among participants, as pointed out in other studies
(Turow et al., 2015).  While the use of CCTV systems is advertised in public spaces,
no information about when, how, and by whom DPI is operated is made available
while users are surfing the Web. Even smartphone location tracking was perceived
more favourably.  Thus, DPI raises more concerns and generates negative reactions
even among British participants, who were on average the more willing to support
the adoption of surveillance measures.
‘I don’t know what I will do. I’m paranoid even though I do nothing wrong’.
‘It is out of our hands, there is nothing we can do’.
‘The majority will just have to accept it if they want to use the Internet’.
‘Up until now, I didn’t realize they monitor our Internet’.
(Statements made by participants and reported by Note Taker no. R01)
These perceptions are exacerbated by the fact that everyone goes online (see Figure
4.3).  The large majority of participants said they use the Internet ‘all of the time’
(minimum 39 per cent in Italy; maximum 70 per cent in the UK). In other terms,
the Web is now a space of social and economic interaction which is constitutive of
everyday life. It is increasingly difficult to try to live offline.  This is an important
consideration, because it implies that any problem produced by technologies that
intrude our privacy and human rights in cyberspace can no longer be simply
dismissed as something that can be solved by ‘not going online’.
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Figure 4.3 Distribution of answers to the question ‘How often do you use the internet?’
Within this context, it is worth noticing that almost two-thirds of EU house-
holds have Internet access at home and that nowadays people are more likely to
access the Internet through a combination of both home and mobile phone
connections (EC, 2014); these considerations help us understand the extent to
which Europeans are constantly exposed to the risk of Internet surveillance.  As a
result, the majority of participants in five countries out of six said to worry about
Internet security, while most Hungarians were indecisive or not concerned (see
Figure 4.4).
The rise in the number of activities performed on the Web makes it difficult for
people to simply avoid the digital space as they would avoid going to a certain
neighbourhood or to any other geographical space. Nonetheless only a small
proportion of people (22 per cent) declared to be absolutely sure they were not
willing to change their behaviour because of DPI, while a largest proportion of
people said that, in principle, they would not change their online behaviour
because of DPI (40 per cent). On the other hand, one-third of respondents were
said to be willing to act in a different way when they were online (31 per cent),
and some participants said they would even avoid going online (6 per cent). See
results displayed in Figure 4.5.
Becoming aware of DPI and concerned about it, however, do not constitute per
se sufficient conditions for people to actively oppose, or avoid, technologies such as
DPI.  As shown in Figure 4.6, obtaining more information on how to protect one’s
privacy is the top priority for the majority of participants (55 per cent). Only a
small proportion of respondents would be willing to actively resist DPI (10 per
cent), campaign against it (11 per cent), or support those who protest against its use
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Figure 4.4 Level of agreement with the statement ‘I worry about security when I am
online’
(13 per cent).  The most likely form of resistance would probably be enacted
through individual actions on personal digital devices (Lyon, 2007).
When it comes to the topic of the adoption of DPI as a national security meas-
ure, as shown in Figure 4.7, the public is divided between those who are in favour
(46 per cent), those who are against it (34 per cent), and those who are undecided
(19 per cent).
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Figure 4.5 Active avoidance of DPI
Figure 4.6 Challenging the use of DPI for security purposes
I would not go online
because of DPI
I would avoid going 
online because of DPI
I would change how I
behave online because
of DPI
I do not think I would
change my behaviour
online
I would definitely not
change my behaviour
online
I am prepared to use any
means I can to prevent its
use
I am prepared to campaign
actively against its use
I would support others who
were protesting against its
use
I would like to find out more
on how to protect my privacy
I do not oppose it at all
To conclude, DPI can be considered a very ambiguous technology: Internet
users recognise its benefits in the security area, but they are also concerned about
online surveillance. For this reason, as shown in Figure 4.5, they would like to
know more about how to protect their privacy online and would welcome more
effective regulation on the matter. Nonetheless they do not succumb to the chill-
ing effect (Askin, 1972) and tend to refuse to change the way they behave online
because of DPI.  The lack of information, knowledge and transparency contribute
to the emergence of an apparently static scenario, which is characterized by frus-
trated users who are concerned about their privacy and feel powerless and resigned.
As a result, considering that most of the times citizens are monitored by SOSTs
without having a chance to opt out, assessing SOSTs’ acceptability in advance
becomes absolutely necessary. In fact, more qualitative studies are necessary to study
under which conditions, and for what purposes, the use of technologies like DPI
can be considered acceptable by the citizens.  As previously said, we could not
investigate DPI acceptability in depth because of limitations in the qualitative data
gathered, so in the next section we move to explore and discuss factors influenc-
ing public acceptance of DPI.
Factors influencing public acceptance of DPI
Within this section we analyse survey data gathered during the citizen summits.
The aim is to investigate factors influencing public acceptance of DPI.  We use the
statement ‘Overall I support the adoption of Deep Packet Inspection as a national
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Figure 4.7 Agreement with the statement ‘Overall I support the adoption of Deep Packet
Inspection as a national security measure’
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
security measure’ to measure the dependent variable.  We have taken into consid-
eration the following independent variables:
• DPI’s perceived effectiveness (EFF);
• DPI’s perceived intrusiveness (INT);
• Social proximity (SPRO);
• Privacy risks (RISK);
• Security operators’ degree of trustworthiness (THR).
Each independent variable has been measured with one or more questionnaire
item. Exact formulation of the questions is reported in Table 4.2.
We have used median regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) to test the effect
of the independent variables on public acceptance of DPI. Most notably, the
outcomes show how DPI’s perceived effectiveness and system operators’ trustwor-
thiness play a relevant positive role in determining public acceptance.  The fact that
DPI is used only to investigate criminal activity also increases the chances of
supporting the use of DPI. In contrast, the fact that DPI is perceived to intrude
into a person’s life, and that it entails risks due to errors, such as misinterpretation
of one’s behaviour, decreases the likelihood of supporting its adoption. In other
words, the perceived effectiveness of DPI in contributing to the fight against
terrorism and other major crimes, contributes positively to the acceptance of DPI.
However, and for the same reason, the perceived intrusiveness of the technology
produces concern and rejection. In between these two basic relations, there exist
other variables that also influence acceptance in one way or another. For instance,
the trustworthiness of public authorities using DPI contributes positively to the
acceptance of DPI, and so does the perception that DPI is being used against
specific crimes, like child pornography and terrorism, and against a specific human
target, i.e. criminals and suspects (SPRO). Conversely, the perceived risk of abuse,
or misuse, negatively influences the acceptance of DPI.
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Table 4.2 Questions measuring perceived effectiveness, intrusiveness, social proximity,
trustworthiness and various privacy risks
I.V. Questionnaire item
EFF1 In my opinion, DPI is an effective national security tool
EFF2 When I am online, I feel more secure because DPI is used
EFF3 DPI is an appropriate way to address national security threats
INT1 The idea of DPI makes me feel uncomfortable
INT2 I feel DPI is forced upon me without my permission
SPRO DPI does not bother me as long as it only targets criminals
RISK1 DPI worries me because it could reveal sensitive information about me
RISK2 DPI worries me because it could result in my behaviour being misinterpreted
RISK3 DPI worries me because it could reveal the content of my communications
RISK4 DPI worries me because it could violate my fundamental human rights
TRU1 Security agencies which use DPI are trustworthy
Apart from studying the direct relationship between the independent variables
and the dependent variable, we have also studied relationships among independent
variables listed in Table 4.2, in order to explore whether they influence each other
and in what ways. In doing this, we have used a non-parametric statistical tech-
nique called Kendall’s rank correlation (Kendall, 1970), which provides a
distribution free test of independence and a measure of the strength of dependence
between two variables.
By looking at rank correlation coefficients, four major results emerge. First, and
contrary to what one would expect, perceived intrusiveness and perceived effec-
tiveness are negatively related.  We had imagined that DPI would be considered
effective precisely as a result of its intrusiveness. In contrast, people who perceive
DPI as highly intrusive are less willing to consider the technology to be effective,
probably because they do consider that DPI is more effective when it is used to
tackle specific crimes, and not when it is implemented as part of a massive surveil-
lance strategy.  As a matter of fact, and this is the second confirmed result, if DPI
were used just to monitor and investigate criminal activity, rather than being used
to screen the communications of all online users, summit participants would be
more inclined to consider DPI as an appropriate security measure.  Third, it is
precisely the privacy risks associated with DPI, such as misinterpretation of users’
online behaviour, human right violation, and unauthorized disclosure of confiden-
tial communications that make people consider DPI as highly intrusive. Finally, the
fact that security agents who manage DPI are considered to be trustworthy by citi-
zens plays an important role not only vis-à-vis its acceptance, but also in relation
to its perceived intrusiveness.  Agents’ trustworthiness contributes to both increase
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Table 4.3 Median regression
[D.V.] ACC1: ‘Overall I support the Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. 
adoption of Deep Packet Inspection Interval]
as a national security measure’
EFF1: ‘In my opinion, DPI is an .465 .034 13.65 0.000 .398 .532
effective national security tool’
INT2: ‘I feel DPI is forced upon –.132 .042 –3.12 0.002 –.215 –.049
me without my permission’
SPRO: ‘DPI does not bother me .153 .029 5.26 0.000 .096 .210
as long as it only targets criminals’
RISK2: ‘DPI worries me because –.083 .036 –2.32 0.021 –.154 –.013
it could result in my behaviour 
being misinterpreted’
TRU1: ‘Security agencies which use .305 .035 8.82 0.000 .237 .373
DPI are trustworthy’
Constant .597 .168 3.54 0.000 .266 .928
Notes: Number of observations = 864
Pseudo R2 = 0.3574
Table 4.4 Kendall’s rank correlation
EFF1 EFF2 EFF3 INT1 INT2 SPRO RISK1 RISK2 RISK3 RISK4 TRU1
EFF1 0.774
EFF2 0.279* 0.725
EFF3 0.445* 0.344* 0.776
INT1 –0.279* –0.300* –0.291* 0.730
INT2 –0.142* –0.200* –0.169* 0.269* 0.518
SPRO 0.281* 0.244* 0.326* –0.224* –0.104* 0.782
RISK1 –0.154* –0.179* –0.191* 0.258* 0.187* –0.138* 0.642
RISK2 –0.136* –0.143* –0.181* 0.208* 0.144* –0.102* 0.245* 0.668
RISK3 –0.157* –0.191* –0.192* 0.272* 0.193* –0.131* 0.342* 0.264* 0.628
RISK4 –0.180* –0.194* –0.226* 0.237* 0.187* –0.126* 0.273* 0.287* 0.331* 0.631
TRU1 0.233* 0.210* 0.257* –0.221* –0.148* 0.257* –0.211* –0.159* –0.178* –0.185* 0.765
Note: * Significance level 1%
the likelihood of accepting DPI and of reducing its perceived privacy risks and,
thus, its perceived intrusiveness.
Discussion and conclusion
Surveillance-based security measures are conceived and designed to fight crime
and reduce violence. Despite this legitimate purpose, these technologies bring new
risk of human rights infringement, or potential negative consequences for citizens,
which have to be taken into consideration at the time of assessing these solutions.
Human rights risks and potential externalities can be reduced by means of organi-
zational and procedural measures, and through the investigation of public
perceptions and understanding of these measures.
Drawing from the quantitative data proceeding from 12 citizen summits, and
from the qualitative data proceeding from the UK citizen summit, this study has
explored the topic of public acceptance of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI).
According to our results, study participants express deep concerns about the wide-
spread use of DPI by security agencies, but, at the same time, acknowledge the
potential contribution of DPI in the fight against major crimes. In general, DPI is
considered a very intrusive technology, especially because it operates in what it is
perceived to be a private space.  The lack of transparency and information on the
use of DPI on the Internet contribute to transform DPI in the least accepted tech-
nology among the SOSTs assessed during the Surprise citizen summits.  Although
the perceived trustworthiness of security operators, and the perceived effectiveness
of DPI, contributes positively to increase its acceptance, the risk of abuse, or misuse,
makes it a very controversial technology.  This is an especially relevant issue, because
DPI operates on the Web, where people perform most of their activities and
communications nowadays. However, online users enjoy their freedom on the Web
and are not willing to give up their rights to free expression and self-determina-
tion because of the potential chilling effect produced by technologies like DPI.
The more citizens become aware of the existence of online surveillance, the
more likely they are to realize that they need to know much more about how to
protect their privacy online.  The complexity of the situation people face – on one
side the need to be online, and on the other one, a certain feeling of frustration, or
resignation, generated by the perceived lack of knowledge and control over digital
technologies and personal data – is misleadingly described by the so-called ‘privacy
paradox’.
On the base of our analysis we argue that technology assessment, especially in
the security area, needs to go beyond cost-benefit analysis and take into consider-
ation the interplay between technological attributes, such as accuracy and
effectiveness, and non-technological considerations related to system operators’
level of competence and integrity.  Technological systems, in fact, operate always
within specific socio-cultural contexts and the characteristics of the context influ-
ence not only the way technology is operated and regulated, but also the way it is
perceived and judged.  This is why the societal knowledge offered and used by
study participants should not be neglected: their concerns often reflect the reality
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of specific socio-cultural contexts, wherein the technology is implemented and
regulated.  When assessing a technology social, economic, and institutional features
are crucial to properly assess the impact and benefits of a given technology. For
instance, in the view of the citizens participating in this study, DPI is intrusive as
much as it is effective: to the contrary, the degree of intrusiveness of this technol-
ogy is considered an indicator of its lack of effectiveness.  A more focused, and
therefore less intrusive, use of interception of Internet traffic would make citizens
perceive the latter as more effective.
In many ways, these considerations suggest that the trade-off between privacy
and security is, in fact, a false one.  The right to the integrity of our communica-
tions, relations and information is a key element of human security, and citizens
consider it as important as the right to physical integrity and protection from
violence.  This understanding of security, which involves both digital security and
physical security, suggests that framing our right to the integrity of our communi-
cation, relations and personal information as ‘privacy’ in opposition to ‘security’ is
effectively diverting attention from the fact that governments are giving priority to
the protection of physical security at the expenses of other, equally fundamental,
elements of human security. Moreover, the approach prevents public scrutiny and
hides the fact that current approaches prioritize the territorial integrity of the State
and the physical security of the citizen, at the expense of other conceptions of
security.
Following this way of reasoning, more security (in terms of investments, tech-
nologies, etc.) can sometimes results in less security (in terms of perceived public
security). For instance, the effectiveness of DPI is often assessed against more tradi-
tional security measures, such as the number of police officers infiltrated or police
intelligence fieldwork, from a cost-benefit perspective. In this way, DPI is not being
assessed on the basis of the impact it has on other aspects of human security, such
as, the integrity of people’s movements and relations or the risk of data leaks.  The
societal knowledge offered by the citizens participating in this study, can help ques-
tion current approaches to security precisely along these lines.  There is a clear need
to develop new security approaches that do not rely on the trade-off, and, rather,
approach security from a systemic perspective, i.e., a view that considers simulta-
neously the totality of security needs of the society and that approaches individual
security from a more sophisticated and comprehensive human security perspective
where all aspects of individual security are taken into account and where every
security measure introduced is assessed against the overall security balance of the
society (Pavone et al., 2016).
Security measures, both technological and non-technological, need to foster
public safety both in objective terms, by reducing crime, and in subjective terms,
by helping people feeling secure and protected.  With this chapter, we hope to
contribute to this long awaited transition from the old privacy–security trade-off
model, to the development of a new win-win security paradigm, where surveil-
lance is minimized and where all aspects of human security, including those today
presented as part of the privacy dimension, are intimately aligned.
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